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INTRODUCTION: DOMESTIC LITIGATION ON A GLOBAL ISSUE
Increasing recognition of global interdependence and the global
nature of several major issue areas has sparked sharp debate over the
role of international and foreign law in U.S. courts. The debate reached
a boiling point with several recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions, as
abundant commentary attests. The major task for scholars in this con-
text is to distill the value that can be extracted for both the U.S. legal
system and the international regimes from greater cognizance of interna-
tional legal sources by U.S. judges, as well as identifying the form that
such cognizance should take.
Transnational questions are arising in many issue areas and often
cross-cut among them. Human rights questions have been most promi-
nent in focusing domestic judicial attention on international regimes.
The questions raised cut across the domestic constitutional, criminal and
procedural landscapes. Other major areas include financial regulation,
response to terrorism, and environmental protection.
In the last of these areas, one particular issue has commanded more
global attention than perhaps any environmental problem in history:
climate change. At the same time, the U.S. political branches have utterly
failed to respond to the threat in anything approaching an effective and
unified manner. Largely because of this failure, climate change has steadily
made its way onto the federal court docket as an issue to be reckoned with.
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Climate change is clearly aglobal problem, affecting a global public
good.' The causes and effects plainly transcend national boundaries.2 As
is widely recognized, a solution to climate change must also be global in
the sense that any successful effort to avert the negative impacts of
climate change on natural, socio-political and economic systems will
require global coordination.3 Despite the absence of significant federal law
on climate change, U.S. courts addressing climate change issues have
given scant attention to the burgeoning international regime.
International efforts to address climate change have played a major
role in shaping domestic perceptions and reactions to the issue. For exam-
ple, the scientific case for climate change was advanced most prominently
at the international level through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change ("IPCC"),4 which U.S. reports and legislation have since relied on.
Based on international negotiations and the reception of scientific evidence
by the international community, an international consensus has emerged
' E.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1554 (2006) ("[Iun recent decades a series of
inescapably international problems have emerged, including climate change, thinning
of the Earth's protective ozone layer, loss of biodiversity, and depletion of fisheries in the
world's oceans.").
2E.g., Michelle M. Betsill, Global Climate Change Policy: Making Progress or Spinning
Wheels?, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS, LAW, AND POLICY 103,103 (Regina
S. Axelrod et. al eds., 2005).
3 E.g., Esty, supra note 1, at 1500-01.
Some international externalities are best understood as a function of
the workings of the natural world rather than policy choices. Certain
environmental problems, such as climate change, are inescapably
global. Absent policy cooperation at the international scale, these
'super-externalities' will result in market failures, economic inef-
ficiency, and social welfare loss, not to mention environmental de-
gradation. Similarly, without international policy cooperation, shared
resources such as the oceans and their fisheries will be overexploited
and global public goods (such as public health and environmental
protection programs) will be underproduced.
Id. See also Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local
Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007) (arguing that global coordination
is necessary and local or state-level action can only have limited value). But see Hari M.
Osofsky, Is Climate Change 'International'? Litigation's Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA.
J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2008). In any event, climate change is plainly contributing to the
globalization of environmental issues and legal responses.
4 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT (2007) [hereinafter Fourth Assessment Report] (describing observations of
climate change and their effects, assessment of the causes, and projections of future
changes based on different scenarios).
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concerning both the threat posed by climate change and the need to take
regulatory action aimed at controlling it.'
Since at least 2001, however, the U.S. federal government failed to
keep pace with emerging legal principles by rejecting the Kyoto Protocol,
failing to adopt any significant domestic regulation of greenhouse gases,
and avoiding leadership on, if not impeding, ongoing international negotia-
tions.6 Municipalities, states, and multi-state regional entities within the
United States have worked to fill this void.7 Thus, the United States'
approach to climate change is unusual among environmental problems in
that lawmaking is occurring above and below the national government, at
the international and the sub-national levels, but no significant federal
climate change policy exists.'
At the same time, federal litigation on issues of climate change has
become a major feature of the push to increase U.S. action toward a solu-
tion.9 These cases raise novel questions of domestic law and rely upon
acceptance of scientific understanding of the complex mechanisms and
likely impacts of climate change. Recently, a number of federal court
opinions recognized climate change as a major environmental threat
requiring governmental attention. Several cases, most prominently
Massachusetts v. EPA, require federal agencies to directly confront evi-
dence of climate change and the need for regulation.' ° Other decisions
require agencies to consider climate change effects in planning and
decision-making, or uphold state action on climate change in the face of
challenges. Although most U.S. climate change cases do not explicitly
See id. at 62; see also Asheline Appleton et al., Summary of the Thirteenth Conference
of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Third
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: 3-15 December 2007, Earth Negotiations
Bulletin, Dec. 18, 2007, at 1, [hereinafter ENB Summary] available at http://www
.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12354e.pdf(discussing the December 2007 negotiations in Bali).
6 See ENB Summary, supra note 5, at 19 (discussing efforts to re-engage the United
States in negotiations).
' Notably, some of these efforts borrow directly from the international climate change
regime. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
8 This article maintains that climate change norms have been established primarily at
the international level, but depend upon national and sub-national government
implementation. This arrangement requires international norms to enter into domestic
legal systems. In the absence of national action by the political branches, federal courts
are beginning to take the lead on judicial internalization of climate change in the United
States. See discussion infra Parts IV & V.
' Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 43A STAN.
J. INT'L L. 181, 182-83 (2007).
10 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1438 (2007).
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employ international law they are nonetheless informed by it and contrib-
ute to it in an indirect way.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA contributes
significantly to the legal status of climate change in the United States.
It also set the parameters for the domestic climate change cases that
have followed in its wake. I suggest that the case can be understood as
responding to international consensus on the issue.1' International law
plays no formal role in the case, but international norms are implicitly
reflected in the Massachusetts majority's opinion and may grow more
explicit in the reasoning of future cases. The context of the case is so
thick with global significance that one must acknowledge at least an
indirect relationship between the case and the international norms
bearing on climate change.
The question whether international norms should play a role in
domestic climate change cases falls within a broader context of scholarship
examining the proper role of international or foreign legal sources in
domestic U.S. litigation more generally. Much of the hotly contested debate
addresses human rights norms and constitutional protections because that
is where incorporation of external sources is most prominent.
Environmental issues, particularly those of global importance,
present an equally appropriate and relatively unexplored forum for
contributing to the dialogue. Indeed, on questions of climate change, the
global community is inexorably linked, law is developing in multiple fora
simultaneously, and many arguments raised against U.S. judicial use of
foreign sources for constitutional interpretation have no force.
Accordingly, this Article has two principle aims. First, situating a
positive assessment of the extent to which U.S. courts have invoked inter-
national environmental law, particularly in the recent wave of climate
change litigation, within the context of the U.S. Supreme Court's invoca-
tion of foreign and international human rights sources. Second, advancing
a normative argument employing international environmental law in
domestic climate change cases, including an examination of the legitimacy
and value of looking to the international regime to understand how climate
change should affect interpretation of U.S. domestic law. 2
"See infra Part IV.B.1.
"Melissa Waters notes that much of the debate over the use of foreign and international
sources adopts a "wide lens" approach that conflates the different types of sources. She
advocates "a narrow lens approach [that] focuses on one particular source of legal
authority and explores the range of specific techniques that enable courts to utilize that
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Part I of this Article documents the growth of international
environmental law by highlighting its normativity, the United States'
role in its creation, and the relevance of international environmental
norms for sub-national action in the United States. Part II discusses
transnational legal developments, including the constitutional and
historical relevance of transnationalism for U.S. courts. Part III high-
lights recent human rights cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has
referred to foreign or international legal sources and moderate theories
of how these sources could be more fruitfully used in that context. Part
IV provides a primer on the courts' interactions with international
environmental law, then analyzes the role of international norms in
recent U.S. climate change litigation. Part V presents my argument for
greater use of international sources in climate change cases. Specifically,
I demonstrate the legitimacy of such practice, identify the relevant norms,
establish advantages for the United States both at home and abroad, and
detail how specific international norms can be valuable in deciding cases.
In essence, I conclude that explicitly analyzing international
climate change norms in domestic climate change cases would increase
uniformity and clarity of the basis for judicial consideration of climate
change issues and legal responses, enhance the international standing
and influence of the United States, and foster the development of more
effective international and foreign climate regimes. 3 Increased judicial
use of the international regime should not replace domestic bases for
decisions, but can inform them.
source in interpreting domestic law." Melissa Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial
Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
628, 632 (2007). This article examines only the climate change context and looks
primarily at the value of using norms enshrined in the UNFCCC to understand and
enhance domestic environmental law.
13 Greater discussion of international norms in U.S. courts could also benefit the
international regime by providing additional tests and application of its framework, and
simultaneously make the United States a greater player in the international regime by
contributing to it through judicial interpretation. It would also potentially prod legislative
and executive actions, but that is more a matter of strategy than law and, accordingly,
is not developed here.
182 [Vol. 33:177
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I. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CONTEXT, GROWTH
AND RELEVANCE
The core concept of international environmental law is the obliga-
tion to avoid transboundary harm. This norm was stated as follows in
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration: "States have . . . the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities
within theirjurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." 4
Although the principle appears to pull in two directions, the second part
of the statement remains one of the most compelling features of interna-
tional environmental law. The principle was adopted, almost verbatim, in
the 1992 Rio Declaration. 5 Its roots date back to at least the Trail Smelter
arbitration. 6 This obligation to respect the environment beyond areas of
national jurisdictions was recognized as a principle of customary interna-
tional law by the International Court of Justice in 1996.1
International environmental law has grown dramatically since the
Stockholm Declaration, as have other areas of global regulation. "Environ-
mental issues were long thought to be largely local, [b]ut in recent decades"
several inescapably global problems have emerged. 8 "Thinning of the
Earth's protective ozone layer" galvanized the international community
into action, producing one of the most complex and successful multilateral
environmental regimes, expressed most completely in the Montreal Proto-
col.' 9 Climate change must create a similarly effective response and,
"
4 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of
Principles, Session of June 5-16, 1972, Principle 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, reprinted
in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972); see also PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 235-36 (2d ed. 2003).
i" Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. CED, Session of June 3-14, 1992, Principle 2, Agenda Item 9, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876,876 (1992); see also SANDS, supra
note 14, at 236.
1Id. at 241.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
241-42 (July 8) ("The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas
beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the
environment.").
18 Esty, supra note 1, at 1554.
1d. See generally, SANDS, supra note 14, at 342-56.
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indeed, the Kyoto Protocol builds on many elements of the Montreal
Protocol.2 ° Yet, climate change is a problem presenting much more complex
challenges that are similar to global natural resources problems, such as
loss of biodiversity and depletion of ocean fisheries, for which a solution
has long remained elusive.2' All three problems involve global public goods
that are perceived to be directly at odds with national economic develop-
ment goals.
In 1992, 155 nations, including the United States, entered the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC"),
which has been described as "the first international environmental
agreement to be negotiated by virtually the whole of the international
community."22 The UNFCCC, which was ratified by the U.S. Congress
but does not contain binding commitments to reduce emissions, seeks
"stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere."23 The
UNFCCC requires parties to adopt measures and policies toward this
end.24 "These policies and measures will demonstrate that developed
countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in
anthropogenic emissions" of greenhouse gases.25
Negotiation of the UNFCCC's 1997 Kyoto Protocol involved over
150 states and seeks to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases through
mandatory reductions by developed nations that are parties.26 It permits
emissions allowance trading and offsetting through, among other means,
supporting "clean development" in developing nations and creates admin-
istrative oversight bodies. With these flexibility mechanisms and other
innovative design features, the Kyoto Protocol contains "an unprece-
dented level of detail and complexity" for an international instrument
regulating environmental issues. For these reasons, international law
20 See SANDS, supra note 14, at 357-81.
21 All three problems are global commons issues that have thus far defied effective
control. See, e.g., id. at 497-98, 615-17.22Id. at 359.
'United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, openedfor signature
June 4, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] (entered into force on Mar. 21,
1994).24 Id. art. 4.2(a).
25 Id.
2 Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto
Protocol U.N. Doc. No. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1 (Dec. 10, 1997), 1998 37 I.L.M. 32; see
also Philippe Sands & Jacqueline Peel, Environmental Protection in the Twenty-First
Century: Sustainable Development and International Law, in THE GLOBALENVIRONMENT
43, 44 (Regina S. Axelrod et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
2Id. at 48.
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addressed toward solving the problem of global warming represents the
cutting edge of international environmental law, both in terms of consen-
sus on policy goals and the sophistication of international mechanisms
agreed to by most states excluding the United States.28
International environmental law includes concepts of varying
degrees of legal obligation. This "relative normativitiy" can be usefully
analyzed through the lens of policies, which for our purposes we may
assume have nothing more than political persuasive force, and rules or
principles, which have different degrees of legal force. This framework,
initially developed by Ronald Dworkin,29 is applied to international envi-
ronmental law by Ulirch Beyerlin to assess various general norms and
policies.3° For the purposes of the argument I develop, we need only be
concerned with identifying principles and rules. Further, the distinction
between rules and principles, with which Dworkin and Beyerlin are
primarily concerned, is of only secondary importance here."l
The norm against transboundary environmental damage, dis-
cussed at the outset of this section, is arguably the most firmly
entrenched norm of international environmental law. It is both en-
shrined in treaties and recognized as customary international law. Other
norms relevant to this article arise from treaty obligations and depend,
for their legally significant character in U.S. courts, on the degree to
which the United States has embraced an internationally recognized and
formalized rule or principle. These conditions are met for basic climate
change norms.32
Evidence of the global consensus on the need for measures in
response to global warming is plentiful. Among the most recent illustra-
tions are the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC and extensive
negotiations under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol in December 2007.
The IPCC report is a widely accepted and scientifically rigorous report
that paints a grim portrait of climate change impacts and demonstrates
the need for greater international cooperation and effective regulation.3
2 Id. at 59-60.
2 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 22-28 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977).
" Ulrich Beyerlin, Different Types of Norms in International Environmental Law:
Policies, Principles and Rules, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENvIRON-
MENTAL LAW (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
31 In Dworkin's framework, rules are "all-or-nothing" norms, whereas principles are taken
into acocount by decision-makers and incline them in one direction or another. DWROICN,
supra note 29, at 22-26.
32The precise definition and application of the norms is discussed further in Part V, infra.
See Fourth Assessment Report, supra note 4.
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The theme was re-emphasized during recent negotiations in Bali, serving
as a meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC and a conference of the
parties to the Kyoto Protocol.34
The United States has joined only the UNFCCC, and rejected the
Kyoto Protocol, but it remains involved in the regime addressing climate
change.35 The United States played a strong role in the negotiations
leading to the Kyoto Protocol, ultimately exerting a significant influence
on the shape of the final agreement and accepting, albeit not ratifying,
an emissions quota limitation.36 Even after President Bush's rejection of
the Kyoto Protocol, the United States has remained an important player
in climate change negotiations, including the meeting in Bali in Decem-
ber 2007.17 Despite advancing a preference for non-binding measures,
the United States has repeatedly acknowledged the threat posed by
climate change and the need for action to redress it.3"
More importantly, "[tihe UNFCCC's provisions have been agreed
to by Congress and are now part of a binding treaty. They therefore consti-
tute fully vetted U.S. promises about how it will approach global warm-
ing."39 Likewise, by its ratification of the UNFCC, the United States has
accepted a good faith obligation to move forward with climate change
policy.4 ° Thus, although one might argue that the United States has
repudiated any global consensus concerning the need for an internation-
ally binding emissions quota, it is beyond dispute that the U.S. has ac-
ceded to the global norm demanding action at the domestic level.4 '
See generally ENB Summary, supra note 5.
3 See David Leonard Downie, Global Environmental Policy: Governance Through
Regimes, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 64,64 (Regina S. Axelrod et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
Individuals "would fail to understand global environmental policy in a given issue area
if they focused only on a single treaty rather than the entire evolving set of principles,
norms, rules, procedures, and institutions-the 'international regime'-that countries
and other actors create and implement for a specific issue." Id.36 E.g., DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 676-79 (3d ed. 2007).
37 E.g., ENB Summary, supra note 5, at 18-19.
3 See Lawrence J. Speer, United States Committed to Discussing Post-Kyoto Framework,
U.S. Negotiation Says, 30 INT'L ENV'T REP. 687, 687 (2007) (discussing the Bush
administration's strategy for international climate change negotiations).
3' Donald A. Brown, The U.S. Performance in Achieving Its 1992 Earth Summit Global
Warming Commitments, 32 ENvTL L. REP. 10,741, 10,741 (2002).
4 See Osofsky, supra note 9, at 203.
41 Indeed, the Bush Administration claims to embrace a climate change policy that
emphasizes voluntary emissions reductions programs, despite its rejection of binding
international regulation of emissions. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press
Secretary, Fact Sheet: Taking Additional Acton to Confront Climate Change (Apr. 16,
2008) (on file at httpJ/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/ 2 0 0 8O41 6 - 7 .html).
[Vol. 33:177186
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In the absence of a coherent federal approach to climate change,
sub-national efforts have arisen. "[Elvery state in the country has
adopted some sort of law or policy addressed to climate change."42 Eleven
western states and Canadian provinces entered an agreement to collec-
tively reduce their emissions through a regional cap-and-trade program
similar to the Kyoto Protocol's framework.43 California has been particu-
larly aggressive, adopting a variety of mechanisms, including overall
emissions targets.' Hundreds of U.S. cities have entered into agree-
ments with each other and cities around the world to develop more
climate-friendly practices and encourage higher-level action on climate
change.4" While the value of these initiatives may be questioned, they
support the view that norms demanding action on climate change have
taken hold in the United States.46
II. THE INTERFACE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The growth of environmental law in the international arena is
part of a larger change in shape of international law generally. Increas-
ing transnational issues and threats, such as terrorism and the growth
of an interconnected global economy, have spurred similar developments
in other areas. One of the features of this growth is an increasing pene-
tration of international lawmaking into the traditionally domestic
sphere. Transnational threats and the attendant growth of international
institutions in many areas, including the environment, has created a
need to re-examine the relationship between domestic and international
law. Among other things, this need has spawned scholarship that exam-
ines and re-conceptualizes the relationship of national courts to each
other and to international bodies, as well as the penetration of interna-
tional law into domestic legal systems.
42 David Hodas, State Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAw 343, 343
(Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007).
"See Western Climate Initiative Homepage, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org
(last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
"See California Air Resources Board, Climate Change-Background, http://www.arb.ca
.gov/c/cc.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
41 See Lesley Wexler, Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration of Unratified
and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 18-20 (2006).
4' For a critique of these initiatives see Cary Coglianese & Joceyln D'Ambrosio,
Policymaking Under Pressure: The Perils of Incremental Responses to Climate Change,
41 CONN. L. REV (forthcoming 2009).
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A. Transnational Legal Process and Engaging Domestic
Institutions (Norm Internalization)
Many aspects of the interface between domestic and international
law can be understood in terms of the development of"transnational legal
process. v This framework, as articulated by Harold Hongju Koh, involves
norms that arise from international interactions, negotiations and regimes
becoming internalized into domestic legal systems and ultimately influenc-
ing the shape of domestic responses to international problems." In Koh's
articulation of the framework, internalization of norms occurs through
social, political and legal processes and can be driven by a variety of
actors.49 There is no standard formula for norm internalization, but rather
norms enter domestic systems through a mix of potential corridors.5" Thus,
a norm developed in the international arena may secure a degree of social
acceptance, or internalization, as the public begins to adhere to it and
advocate for its greater incorporation into domestic legal and political
systems.51 It may then obtain a degree of political internalization as the
political elite begin to urge the norm's "adoption as a matter of government
policy."52 Legal internalization occurs as the norm becomes established as
a facet of the domestic legal system, whether through executive action,
legislative process, or judicial internalization by incorporating the norms
into domestic law.53 Judicial internalization may involve common law
holdings derived from the international norm, use of the norm to inter-
pret statutes, or drawing upon the international norm to shed light on
domestic constitutional norms.54 In other words, national courts can be
understood as part of a "complex process ... whereby international legal
norms seep into, are internalized, and become embedded in domestic
legal and political processes. ""
In a related norm-based conception of the domestic-international
interface, Anne-Marie Slaughter has advanced a framework for under-
standing international law that relies on its direct engagement with
47E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181,205 (1996).
4 See Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOuS. L. REv. 624,626-27
(1998).49 Id. at 642-43.
o See id. at 643.
61 See id.
52 Id. at 642.
53 Id. at 642-43.
4 See Koh, supra note 48, at 643.
55 Koh, supra note 47, at 205.
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domestic institutions.56 Much of Slaughter's work examines the develop-
ment of transnational networks, including transnational judicial dia-
logue.57 The growth of transnationalism, Slaughter and others posit,
creates a need to re-conceptualize the role of domestic institutions in
international law.58 Thus, she argues that the ability of the international
legal system to effectively respond to emerging transnational problems,
including environmental problems, demands that "the international legal
system ... be able to influence the domestic policies of states and harness
national institutions in pursuit of global objectives." 9 Along these lines,
she has noted that it is valuable for domestic legal and political actors to
be able to point to international regimes as providing a spur or conse-
quence regarding particular legal outcomes or policy results.'
Judith Resnik demonstrates that legal developments outside of
the United States inevitably seep into our law and that such seepage
occurs through multiple entry points.6' Litigation is but one forum for
acknowledging the significance of developments beyond our borders in
developing domestic legal principles and rules. Litigation is particularly
important for U.S. climate change law, however, because of the national
political branches failure to take meaningful action.62 In this instance, as
in others, "[n] ational courts are the vehicles through which international
treaties and customary law that have not been independently incorpo-
rated into domestic statutes enter domestic legal systems."63 Further,
"the trend toward interpretive incorporation [of international sources
into domestic cases] has the potential to transform the world's common
law courts into increasingly powerful mediators between the domestic
and international legal regimes."'
Other scholars are developing these core conceptions of transna-
tional networks and norm internalization in various directions relevant
" See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law
Is Domestic (or The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327, 328 (2006).
See id. at 327-28. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEWWORLD ORDER (2004).
5See Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 56, at 327; see also Benedict Kingsbury et
al., The Emergence of GlobalAdministrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15,31 (2005).
9 Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 56, at 328.
oSee id. at 350.
See Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism's Multiple Posts of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1670 (2006).
62 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'LL. 1103, 1103 (2000).
1 Id.
6 Waters, supra note 12, at 694-95.
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to this Article. Lesley Wexler, for example, examines how treaty norms
enter non-member legal systems through sub-national law embracing the
internationally articulated norms.6' A leading example is the sub-na-
tional embrace of elements of the Kyoto Protocol in the United States
despite failure to ratify at the federal level.66 Among other values, Wexler
identifies a non-ratified treaty as providing "a fully articulated frame-
work by which to understand the problem" and "offering evidence of an
international consensus on the existence of, and approach to, a problem"
that may then be imported into domestic institutions.6"
Although much of the work analyzing the relationship of domestic
courts to international law focuses on how domestic courts may use
international law, "domestic courts worldwide are becoming active partici-
pants in the dynamic process of developing international law."61 Melissa
Waters thus conceives of domestic courts as "mediators between interna-
tional and domestic legal norms" that not only receive and translate
international norms into the domestic legal system, but also possess "the
opportunity and ability.., to participate in the creation, development and
enforcement of international law."69 In Waters' conception, a co-constitu-
tive process occurs in which "various 'law-declaring fora' [including courts]
. articulate and champion domestic norms at the transnational level,.
[that] become part of the international legal discourse, and.., modified
to a greater or lesser extent by the international legal discourse, [these
norms] return to the domestic fora to be internalized into domestic law."7°
This co-constitutive theory depends upon norm export and norm conver-
gence. Norm export depends upon "soft power" to persuade other institu-
tions to adopt the domestic norm, while norm convergence describes the
tendency toward creation of a single worldwide standard.7
Transgovernmental networks involve much more than transna-
tionaljudicial dialogue. Regulatory networks, for example, are particularly
important in environmental law and other areas. Unlike U.S. courts, U.S.
agencies have actively encouraged and participated in these networks. 2
5 See Wexler, supra note 45, at 3; Resnik, supra note 61, at 1633-34.
66 See Wexler, supra note 45, at 12-13.67 Id. at 13.
' Melissa Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 490 (2004).69 Id. at 490, 491.
7 0 Id. at 502.
71 See id. at 502-03.72See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
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The astounding growth of international law and supranational
institutions over the last few decades, as well as the increasingly close
relationship between international concerns and domestic lawmaking,
exacerbate difficulties of accountability at the domestic-international
interface. The question of accountability is perhaps most cogently ad-
dressed through an application of administrative law analysis that
incorporates domestic, international and supranational administrative
implementation." This global administrative law perspective highlights
that "U.S. domestic regulation [may be] increasingly shaped by ...
[gilobal regulatory norms and practices" in particular issue areas."
Relatedly, where a nation participates in an international regime "do-
mestic regulatory agencies act ... on issues of foreign or global concern"
as well as domestic concern.75 Thus,
national environmental regulators concerned with bio-
diversity conservation or greenhouse gas emissions are
today often part of a global administration, as well as part
of a purely national one: they are responsible for imple-
menting international environmental law for the achieve-
ment of common objectives, and their decisions are thus of
concern to governments (and publics) in other states, as
well as to the international environmental regime they are
implementing.76
While much of the concern arising from increased interaction
between the international and national spheres, both popularly and in
scholarship, centers on a reduction of domestic protections or account-
ability that may result, an equally compelling question is whether and
how domestic decision-makers can be held accountable for declining to
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 44-49 (2002)
(discussing the transgovernmental activity of agencies in environmental regulation).
" See generally Kingsbury et al., supra note 58, at 16-18 (exploring the parameters of
global administrative law and highlighting the mechanisms of imposing administrative
discipline on supranational bodies, and the relatively informal pathways or mechanisms
through which the international and national systems influence each other). See also
INST. FOR INT'L LAW AND JUSTICE, GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
ISSUES xxii-xxiv (Cassese et al., eds., 2d. ed. 2008).
4 Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 695, 697 (2005).
" Kingsbury et al., supra note 58, at 21.76 Id. at 22.
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act in accord with international norms that they have helped to create
and acceded to. The role of national courts in such instances can be to
preserve legitimacy of international norms." One of the few avenues to
directly challenge domestic responses to global environmental norms
arises when an agency reaches a conclusion on domestic regulatory
responses to global problems, thus providing a potential mechanism for
legal accountability through judicial review.7"
B. U.S. Courts and International Law: Constitution and History
Scholars debate the extent to which the constitution embraces
dualism.79 Its text merely establishes the procedure for entering into a
treaty and includes treaties, along with the constitution and federal laws,
as the supreme law. °
Harold Koh explains that "[tihe framers and early Justices under-
stood that the global legitimacy of a fledgling nation crucially depended
upon the compatibility of its domestic law with the rules of the interna-
tional system within which it sought acceptance."" l Accordingly, "the early
Supreme Court saw the judicial branch as a central channel for making
international law part of U.S. law." 2 Further, "[tihe original design and
early practice of our courts envisioned that they would not merely accept,
but would actively pursue, an understanding and incorporation ofinterna-
tional law standards out of a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.""3
Some of the Supreme Court's earliest jurisprudence recognizes that
international law may be applied in U.S. courts and may influence the
construction of U.S. law.' Famously, in the Charming Betsy case of 1804,
" See John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions: Of Sovereignty,
Globalization, and Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTs 373,
383 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996).7 8 See infra Part IV.A.
7' For an argument that a dualist tradition should guide the Court's treatment of
international sources, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human
Rights, and Constitutional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000).
80 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
8' Harold H. Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 44 (2004).
8 2 Id.
3 Id.
' E.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419,474 (1793) ("mhe United States had, by taking
a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations. . ."); The
Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388,423 (1815) ("Till [a contrary] act be passed [by Congress],
the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land.").
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the Court stated that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.'
This doctrine remains significant in the Court's jurisprudence, although
its scope is open to some debate.' By the late-nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court construed the supremacy clause to permit domestic law to
prevail over pre-existing international obligations, thereby embracing a
dualist vision of international law." Nonetheless, in 1900, the Supreme
Court stated that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts .... [Wihere there is no treaty
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations."s
Although the Court's conception of the relationship of interna-
tional or foreign sources to domestic law may have changed, "the Court
has relied on such sources to some extent throughout its history." "
88 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
For recent cases employing the doctrine, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764, 816 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982). For a
thorough treatment of the case and its progeny see Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of
International Law as a Canon of Statutory Interpretation, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990).
87 See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863-64 (1987); Louis Henkin, The
President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 930, 932 (1986). Dualism is underlain
by separation ofpowers and sovereignty concerns. See Waters, supra note 12, at 696-97. For
an argument that separation of powers should underlie U.S. dualism see Jonathan Turley,
Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 186
(1993). In the United States, separation of powers concerns are tempered by the
constitutional role of the Senate in treaty ratification. Waters, supra note 182, at 696.
Nonetheless, dualism as articulated in U.S. law retains a connection to the separation of
powers doctrine through, for example, the courts' reluctance to intrude upon the executive's
foreign affairs power or to address political questions. The sovereignty issues underlying
dualism are being eroded by increasing globalization, but this may explain the ferocity with
which many dualist have recently stated their positions. See id. at 696-97. Dualism now
faces increasing pressure as the nature of international law and its relationship to domestic
institutions change. C.f Kingsbury et al., supra note 58, at 31 ("the traditional dualist
separation between the domestic and the international is not sustainable in the integrated
global administrative space"). Indeed, "the relationship between these requires both
continuous pragmatic readjustment and deeper re-theorizing." Id.
' The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The Court further reasoned that, in
divining the existence of customary law, it should (as is established in international law)
look "to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and
experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which
they treat." Id.
89 Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 755 (2005). See generally id. (extensively demonstrating the
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III. RECENT COURT TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SOURCES:
HUMAN RIGHTS
Several recent constitutional human rights cases are important to
understanding the debate over international sources in the U.S. courts.
The issues are far removed from the climate change regime, but the cases
illuminate the current status of global norms in U.S. domestic litigation.
A. International and Foreign Sources in Recent Human
Rights Cases
Recently, the Court has employed international norms in assess-
ing U.S. human rights law. This use is part of a trend occurring through-
out common law countries.9 ° It has stirred fierce debate among publics,
academics, politicians, and judges in the United States and elsewhere.9
The divide is apparent on the Supreme Court, with several Justices, such
as Breyer, advancing an internationalist vision that is aggressively
disputed by others.92
In Washington v. Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion refers to a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, which upheld
a ban on assisted suicide, and observes that "in almost every western
democracy[,] it is a crime to assist a suicide."93 In Lawrence v. Texas,
Justice Kennedy's opinion discusses precedent from the European Court
of Human Rights to establish that claims of homosexuals challenging
sodomy laws are not considered insubstantial in "our Western civiliza-
tion."9 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court reaffirmed that "the domestic
law of the United States recognizes the law of nations" and explained that
Court's use of foreign and international authority throughout the nation's history); Sarah
H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2006) (examining the
role of international law in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the U.S. Constitution);
Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, The Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law:
The Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1364-64 (2007) ("Citing foreign law is an
American tradition that goes back to the first days of the Republic...").
90 Professor Waters has characterized this trend as "creeping monism." See Waters,
supra note 12, at 633.
91 On the U.S. debate see Farber, supra note 89, 124 at 1340-44.
92 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice Supreme Court of the United States,
Keynote Address Before the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 2-5, 2003), in 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 265, 265-68 (2003).
93 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997).
539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (responding to references made to "Western civilization" in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)).
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federal courts retain the power to recognize and enforce a narrow class of
international norms under the Alien Tort Claims Act.95 The next year, in
Roper v. Simmons, the Court ruled that the juvenile death penalty violates
the 8th Amendment.96 Following a discussion of domestic law, the Court
highlighted the international prohibition on the juvenile death pen-alty in
the UN Convention on Rights of the Child, which has been ratified by all
nations except the United States and Somalia." The Court explained that
"[it is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of interna-
tional opinion against the juvenile death penalty," continuing that "[tihe
opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does
provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions."9 '
The Court's use of international law in human rights cases is
limited to what can be described as "gild [ing] the domestic lily"99 because
the international or foreign sources merely support for independently-
derived domestic law conclusions. The citations of international law are
not merely "ridiculous excess," however."0 Instead, the Court's use of
international law may serve not only to signal "willingness to participate
in transnational judicial dialogue on human rights issues" or "emphasize
the importance or fundamental character of a particular domestic norm,"
but may also serve as a buttress to "shore up what would otherwise be
a shaky argument, if based on domestic sources alone."1"1
95 Id. at 729.
96 See 543 U.S. 551, 575, 578 (2005).
97 See id. at 576.
9 Id. at 578; see also id. at 605 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the relationship
between domestic and international laws and values in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment). This use of foreign or international authority has been roundly criticized
by some Justices, most ardently Justice Scalia. See, e.g., id. at 627-28 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Recently, the Court emphasized the United States' dualist tradition. In
Medellin v. Texas, Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion reasoned that "[A] treaty is,
of course, primarily a compact between independent nations. It ordinarily depends for the
enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are
parties to it .... [W]ith all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no
redress." 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Court thus held that a judgment of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") was not
binding on U.S. courts despite the United States submission to ICJ jurisdiction through
its ratification of the relevant portions of the Vienna Conventions. See id. at 1358. Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg, issued a well-reasoned dissent resting
on a long history of judicial application of treaties. See id. at 1375-82.
99 Waters, supra note 12, at 654; see also WILLLAM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE AN) DEATH OF
KING JOHN act 4, sc. 2 (source of the phrase "gild the lily").
100 See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 99.
' Waters, supra note 12, at 657-58.
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B. Theorizing Supreme Court Citation of Foreign and
International Sources in Human Rights Cases
Barrels of ink and forests of trees have been expended in the
debate surrounding the Court's citations of foreign and international
sources in the human rights cases. I touch on just a few points from this
vast literature that are relevant to the topic at hand.
Most importantly, neither the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
nor the scholars commenting on their decisions have thus articulated an
accepted "general theory of the citation and authority of foreign law." °2
The same can be said of the use of international law in domestically-
focused cases. The lack of a unified and accepted theory complicates the
debate because many different uses of international and foreign sources
are possible.103 Below, I sketch two moderate positions on how the U.S.
courts should use foreign and international sources.'0 4 These approaches
are close to the proposal I outline in Section V.C describing the applica-
tion of international climate change norms for the interpretation of
domestic statutes and evaluation of domestic administrative actions.
Melissa Waters suggests a framework in which judges remain
"deeply rooted, first and foremost, in the domestic legal regime" and then
"explore--on a case-by-case basis-the extent to which they can legiti-
mately reach out to specific international sources for assistance, and what
techniques can legitimately be used."105 She urges that courts take account
of the extent to which an unincorporated treaty reflects domestic norms
when determining whether, and to what extent, it can be used. ' 6 More spe-
cifically, Waters urges U.S. courts using international or foreign sources to
consider the relative strength of conflicting domestic and international or
foreign norms, as well as the democracy risks of employing international
norms to assess domestic law made by the political branches.0 7 With these
cautions, she urges use of international sources to interpret domestic law.
... Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129,
129 (2005); cf Waters, supra note 12, at 705 ("What is needed is a fully articulated theory
regarding judicial use of human rights treaties.").
103 See Waters, supra note 12, for a systematic discussion of the approaches pursued by
several common law courts.
104 A strong monist position is not only highly unlikely to take hold in the U.S., but also
constitutionally problematic and, arguably, undesirable even in the climate change context.
For further discussion of monist positions, see Steinhardt, supra note 86, at 1127-28.
105 Waters, supra note 12, at 701.
106 id.
1o' See Waters, supra note 68, at 559-64.
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Jeremy Waldron paints potential U.S. court use of foreign authority
as an analogy to scientific pursuit.10 In Waldron's view, recognition that
U.S. judges derive their legitimacy from U.S. law and directly shape only
U.S. law "does not preclude turning to the legal consensus of civilized
nations for assistance any more than the American origin of an epidemic
precludes Americans' turning to foreign scientists for guidance."0 9 Al-
though U.S. circumstances such as history and culture may be unique on
a given problem, he urges that "we should respond on a scientific basis to
ascertain which peculiarities should be taken into account and how.""0 To
simply ignore legal developments elsewhere in the world on the various
problems facing a U.S. court demonstrates, for Waldron, "not just an
objectionable parochialism, but an obtuseness as to the nature of the
problems we face.""' According to Waldron, the law of other nations, or
international law, can be "a source of normative insight" that is "relevant
to the solution of legal problems in this country.""' Ultimately, Waldron
looks to the ius gentium-the law of nations-as repository of global
consensus in the scientific sense of a "dense and mutually reinforced
consensus."'13 For Waldron, then, law is "essentially a problem-solving
enterprise" that should be approached "in a scientific spirit that relies not
just on our own reasoning but on some rational relation between what we
are wrestling with and what others have figured out.""'
IV. U.S. COURTS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: RELUCTANCE TO
EXAMINE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADVENT OF CLIMATE
CHANGE LITIGATION
A. International Environmental Law in the U.S. Courts
Direct discussion of international environmental law in U.S.
courts has been very limited."5 Most of the cases directly address only
... See Waldron, supra note 102, at 143-46. Waldron's argument is fashioned for foreign
law sources, but the points discussed here are directly relevant to use of international
sources in climate change cases. See id.
'
09 Id. at 144.
110 Id.
111 Id.112 Id. at 143.
113 Waldron, supra note 102, at 145.
114 Id. at 146, 147.
11' The number of cases involving issues of international environmental law has been on
the rise in recent decades, and some predict that this trend will continue. E.g., Carl
Bruch, Is International Environmental Law Really "Law"?: An Analysis of Application
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implementing legislation, but some look to international sources for
guidance.
Missouri v. Holland, the first international environmental law case
to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty Act-a
statute implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty-on the basis of the
federal treaty power." 6 The Court described migratory birds as "a national
interest of very nearly the first magnitude" that "can be protected only by
national action in concert with that of another power.""' Thus, the treaty
power trumped traditional state regulation of wildlife.
In one of the Court's first encounters with a truly global environ-
mental issue, Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society,
the Court examined the question whether implementing legislation
compelled the Secretary of Commerce to certify that Japanese action was
diminishing the effectiveness of the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling."' The Court rejected the Japanese defendants'
argument that the case should be dismissed as a political question." 9 On
the merits, however, the Court decided in favor of the agency with no
significant discussion of the international law." Justice Marshall's
dissent is more careful in considering the international context, stating:
"Such gross disregard for international norms set for the benefit of the
entire world represents the core of what Congress set about to punish
and to deter with the weapon of reduced fishing rights in United States
waters ""'
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, a major standing case, is also an
international environmental law case."' It arose as a challenge to an
agency determination that the Endangered Species Act does not apply to
foreign aid decisions that could hasten the extirpation of species elsewhere
in Domestic Courts, 23 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 423, 461 (2006). Whether such invocation is
appropriate, perhaps even necessary, is a subject of increasing attention. See, e.g., North
America: Symposium on the Judiciary and Environmental Law, 35 ENVTL. POLY & L. 45
(2004) (reporting on a conference of North American judges hosted by the New York State
Judicial Institute that concerned issues such as "use of international norms by domestic
courts" in common environmental problems).
116 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
117 Id. at 435.
"'Japan WhalingAss'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221,223 (1986). Justice Marhsall,
dissenting, characterized the issue as one of "intense worldwide concern." Id. at 242.
"9 Id. at 229.
120 See id. at 240-41.
121 Id. at 249.
122 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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on the planet."2 Justice Scalia's opinion, part of which held for the major-
ity, essentially relied upon the international nature of the case to conclude
that the plaintiffs did not have standing."M He reasoned that the plaintiffs
had not demonstrated injury-in-fact because they did not demonstrate
concrete plans to visit the affected areas-a line of reasoning that would
be difficult to apply in a purely domestic context."z Further, Justice Scalia
concluded that redressability did not exist because, among other reasons,
decisions affecting U.S. foreign aid might not stop challenged projects if
other nations could still provide funds. 26
Several appellate cases have addressed the more complicated
question of the relationship between international environmental law and
domestic enforcement involving the role of post-ratification decisions by
Conferences of the Parties to treaties that the United States has ratified.
127
In Castlewood Products v. Norton, the D.C. Circuit concluded that post-
ratification decisions could be helpful in determining the meaning of
provisions of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies ("CITES"), but were not binding on domestic agencies."' More re-
cently, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit
123 Id. at 557-58. Although not apparent from Justice Scalia's opinion, this type of issue
is pressing. Scientists predict as much as fifty percent of all currently extant species may
be extinct by the end of the century. See Colin Woodward, Earth in the Balance - Could
Tilt Either Way, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 17, 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/
2002/0117/pl5sOl-bogn.html; Sanjida O'Connell, The Killer Oceans: What Really Wiped
Out the Dinosaurs?, INDEP. (London), July 23, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/science/the-killer-oceans-what-really-wiped-out-the-dinosaurs-874661.html. In ad-
dition, "[tihe conservation of biodiversity probably presents greater regulatory challenges
to international law than any other environmental issue." SANDS, supra note 14, at 615.
Climate change alone may result in extinction of fifteen to thirty percent of species by
2050. Stuart L. Pimm et al., What Is Biodiversity?, in SUSTAINING LIFE: How HUMAN
HEALTH DEPENDS ON BIODIVERSITY (Eric Chivian & Aaron Bernstein eds., 2008).
" See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-78. Andrew Long, Standing & Consensus: Globalism in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 23 J. ENvTL L. & LIT. 73 (2008) (discussing this interpretation of
the case in greater detail); see also Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The
Geographic Nexus in Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1247, 1251-54 (1996).
125 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.
126 Id. at 571.
127 Several cases have also examined, and rejected, application of environmental treaties
or international environmental norms to create private liability for alleged torts
committed in other nations. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161,
166-67 (5th Cir. 1999) (regarding Indonesian mining operations); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F.Supp.2d 7, 127-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (regarding the application of
agent orange in Vietnam).
128 Castlewood Prod. v. Norton, 365 F.3d 1076, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to challenge an EPA decision regarding the
production and consumption of methyl bromide on the basis of an alleged
conflict between the EPA rule and decisions of the parties to the Montreal
Protocol entered after treaty ratification. 129 The court held that the "post-
ratification agreements of the parties are not 'law,'" and, thus, cannot form
the basis of a review of EPA action." The court reasoned that enforcing
such decisions in domestic courts could conflict with the non-delegation
doctrine, constitutional lawmaking requirements, and separation of
powers. 131 In an exceedingly dualist characterization of the Protocol body's
power, the court characterized these "decisions" under the Montreal
Protocol as "international political commitments rather than judicially
enforceable domestic law."32 More generally, the court concluded that
"[without congressional action.., side agreements reached after a treaty
has been ratified are not the law of the land; they are enforceable not
through the federal courts, but through international negotiations."33
B. U.S. Climate Change Litigation
As noted above, litigation has recently become a very important
element of the legal, political and social dialogue concerning climate
change." This trend seems attributable, in large part, to the lack of a
coherent national approach to addressing climate change. It is also an
opportunity for judicial internalization of broadly accepted international
environmental norms that demand action on climate change.
U.S. climate change cases have, by and large, not relied on interna-
tional environmental law. This can be explained by the United States' refu-
sal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and dualist separation of powers concerns. 35
129 NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 2007). This opinion was issued upon
reargument of the court's initial decision, which dismissed the suit on standing
grounds.
130 Id. at 11.
131 Id. at 9.
132 Id. at 10.
13 3 Id.
13 E.g., William C.G. Burns, A Voice for the Fish? Climate Change Litigation and
Potential Causes of Action for Impacts Under the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement,
48 SANTA CLARAL. REv. 605,605 (2008) ("Climate change litigation has been transformed
from a creative lawyering strategy to a major force in transnational regulatory
governance of greenhouse gas emissions over the last couple of years.").
135 Also for these reasons, domestic climate change litigation based on entirely
international environmental law--even the bedrock obligation to refrain from damaging
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Nonetheless, climate change litigation presents a particularly com-
pelling context for considering the international backdrop of domestic legal
action. Law at the international, national, and sub-national level addresses
a common physical problem in climate change, one in which the causes and
effects are intermingled and dispersed among all nations of the globe.
1. Massachusetts v. EPA
The most important climate change litigation to date is Massachu-
setts v. EPA.136 The Court issued three holdings, each of which is signifi-
cant in its own right. First, the Court held that plaintiffs had standing to
challenge EPA's decision to decline a rulemaking petition for regulation of
greenhouse gases emissions under the Clean Air Act.'37 On the merits, the
Court held that EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the
Clean Air Act 3' and rejected its reasons for not doing so as insufficiently
grounded in the statute."9 The Court's decision was formally based en-
tirely in domestic law, yet the conclusions it embraces may be understood
as forcing the EPA to directly address the international norm requiring
action on climate change."4 However, the opinion falls short of explicitly
giving international environmental law any direct role in either the rea-
soning or the outcome of the case. Nonetheless, Massachusetts can be
understood as a step toward greater consideration of international environ-
mental concerns in domestic litigation because it embraces a vision of the
United States as a global actor whose actions will contribute to larger
events.' Justice Stevens begins his analysis of the injury in Massachu-
setts by quoting from the globally significant harms of climate change:
"reduction in snow-cover extent, the global retreat of mountain glaciers,
areas beyond national jurisdiction-would be unlikely to succeed.
136 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
137 Id. at 1452-58.
138 Id. at 1459-62.
139 Id. at 1462-63.14Jonathan M. Zasloff, International Decisions: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 102 AM. J. IN'L L. 134, 138 (2008) ("Formally, Massachusetts v. EPA is a domestic
administrative law decision;... [but] the international and foreign relations aspects of the
case... could well turn out to be more important than the domestic ones."). Cf Long, supra
note 124, at 121-23 ("Massachusetts could be a jumping-off point for greater judicial
consideration of domestic regulation of global problems and, perhaps, international regimes
addressing those problems."); Osofsky, supra note 9, at 203 (discussing how judicial
interpretation of federal statutes engages international law and policy).
141 See Long, supra note 124, at 121-23.
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the earlier spring melting of rivers and lakes, the accelerated rate of rise
of sea levels during the 20th century relative to the past few thousand
years,"" as well as "severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems,
and an increase in the spread of disease.""
For causation, Justice Stevens rejects as "erroneous" EPA's "as-
sumption that a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can
never be attacked in a federal judicial forum."' Similarly, and seemingly
contrary to the plurality view in Lujan,45 the majority reasons in discuss-
ing redressability: the fact "that developing countries such as China and
India are poised to increase greenhouse gas emissions substantially over
the next century" does not destroy redressability because "[a] reduction in
domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no
matter what happens elsewhere.""4 In this way, the Court construes
Article III to permit litigation of cases relying upon an injury that is both
shared and caused by the entire international community. This threshold
determination enables a construction of the domestic statute that accords
with overarching international principles and norms by enabling domestic
action to "stabiliz[e] greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere."4 v
The Court's reading of Article III and the Clean Air Act are both
fair readings of domestic law. They are also a mechanism that furthers the
nation's international legal obligations. Although EPA's rejection of the
petition to regulate greenhouse gases was a domestic decision harming
domestic parties, it also declined to take action supported by international
norms."4 By seeking judicial review, the petitioners might be understood
to seek an avenue for indirectly holding domestic regulators accountable
142 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 (quoting NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE
CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS 16 (2001)).
'43 Id. at 1456 (quoting MacCracken Decl. 5(d), 28; Pet. Stdg.App. 209, 218-19).
'44 Id. at 1457.
141 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, 568-71.
146 Id. at 1458.
147 UNFCCC, art. 2.
14 Cf Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law's Growing
Shadow, SuP. CT. REV., 2008, at 111, 147-48.
Perhaps because climate change is now considered a global envi-
ronmental crisis far more serious than the problem of acid rain, the
Court is unwilling to tolerate continued executive inaction. It also
rejects what in this age of globalization could become a nearly
universally applicable excuse for agency inaction-that domestic
regulation might interfere with the President's ability to negotiate a
global approach to a problem.
Id. at 147-48.
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for failing to address a pressing global issue in accord with the interna-
tional consensus requiring regulation. Indeed, Massachusetts seems to be
decided in the shadow of the international context. The decision can be
understood as part of a global legal dialogue.'49 Viewed in this light, the
majority opinion might suggest injection of global concern into
interpretation of domestic environmental statutes'°-an implicit applica-
tion of the Charming Betsy principle.' 5 '
One of the most repeated charges leveled at the majority opinion in
Massachusetts is that the case addresses a political question or is other-
wise politically motivated.'52 The aspects of the decision that the dissenters
and some commentators suggest are political could be understood, instead,
as the Court's acceptance of internationally recognized climate change
norms which emphasize the scientific evidence of global warming, the
urgency of the threat and the attendant need for action.'53 The Court
majority could have preemptively rebutted the charge that the case was
political through more explicit consideration of the significance of interna-
tional law in the opinion." The Court could have looked to the UNFCCC
and the United States' related good faith obligation, as well as the consen-
sus that has emerged among all other developed nations, and the principle
that states have an obligation to avoid harm to the global commons, as
support for its conclusion that the Clean Air Act's definition of "pollutant"
encompasses CO2 . Much like Roper or Lawrence in the human rights con-
text,'55 such reasoning would have brought the United States more fully
within the international community on shared environmental problems.
The Court did not take this approach, however. Thus, alternative
explanations for the case may be more useful for understanding its imme-
"4 See Osofsky, supra note 9, at 203.
150 Yet, the Court does not develop this theme and does not, in any significant way,
consider the relationship of its opinion to the international context.
151 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. See generally Waters, supra note 12, at
660-68 (discussing the Charming Betsy principle in the human rights context).
152 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1471 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Ronald A. Cass,
Massachusetts v. EPA: The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF
75 (2007), available at http'//www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cass.pdf.
" This reading, at least as applied to Justice Kennedy, could also explain the conflict
between Massachusetts' apparently flexible reading of the Clean Air Act and the Court's
greater rigidity in defining the Endangered Species Act's relationship to the Clean Water
Act several months later in Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S.
Ct. 2518 (2007). See Percival, supra note 148, at 143-44.
" Cf Waters, supra note 12, at 660-68 (discussing a "rights-conscious" Charming Betsy
principle).15
' See supra Part III.A.
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diate administrative law impacts. However, that the global norms on
climate change could have played an implicit role in the decision. On this
view, the question is whether explicitly employing global norms would
serve a useful function.
2. Climate Change Litigation in the Lower Courts
Circuit and district court cases have begun to integrate climate
change into domestic environmental statutes. Not surprisingly, most cli-
mate change cases in the circuit and district courts after Massachusetts
v. EPA contain no greater discussion of international environmental law
than Massachusetts did. In Center for Biological Diversity v. National
Highway Traffic and Safety Administration, the Ninth Circuit required
the agency to reconsider its fuel efficiency standards for light trucks.
156
The court stated that "[tihe impact of greenhouse gas emissions on cli-
mate change is precisely the kind of cumulative impacts analysis that
NEPA re-quires agencies to conduct,""' thus integrating climate change
considerations into a domestic environmental statute. The court cited
Massachusetts for its discussion of scientific progress in understanding
climate change and that the harms resulting from it are "well recog-
nized."'58 It also hints at the relevance of international consensus by
referring to IPCC reports, but goes no further in employing the interna-
tional context in its decision.'59
In the Endangered Species Act context, the district court in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Kempthorne held that the Fish and Wildlife
Service ("FWS") erred by failing to consider the impact of climate change
in a biological opinion concluding that water diversion planned for the
California Bay Delta would not jeopardize a listed species, the Delta
smelt."6 Essentially, plaintiffs argued, as they had before the agency, that
the biological opinion was flawed because it assumed hydrology to be con-
stant over the next twenty years despite strong scientific evidence suggest-
ing that climate change will affect the hydrology through reduced winter
snowpack.'6 ' Not unlike the EPA in Massachusetts, FWS argued that it
"
5 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Natl Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 514
(9th Cir 2007).
157 Id. at 550.
'5 Id. at 530 n.41.
5 9 Id. at 522-23, 554-55.
"o N-RDC v. Kempthorne, 506 F.Supp.2d 322, 387-88 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
161 Id. at 367-68.
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"responsibly refused to engage in sheer guesswork, and properly declined
to speculate as to how global warming might affect delta smelt.""2 Unlike
Center for Biological Diversity, the court in Kempthorne did not cite Massa-
chusetts nor elaborate the strength of scientific consensus on climate
change." It did, however, conclude that "[a]t the very least,... studies [in
the record] suggest that climate change will be an important aspect of the
problem meriting analysis in the BiOp."' On this basis, after rejecting an
argument that other factors in the BiOp were sufficient proxies for climate
change, the court granted plaintiffs' summary adjudication on the ground,
among others, that the BiOp failed to consider the effects of climate
change." The case lacked any relevant attention to the potential signifi-
cance of the international climate change regime.
These two cases illustrate the role of litigation in firmly establish-
ing the legal acceptance of climate change as a scientifically demonstrated
phenomenon. They bolster Massachusetts' impact in putting an end to
claims that climate change is too scientifically uncertain to play a role in
agency planning. They draw upon the international regime, if at all, as
evidence of the scientific consensus. It is difficult to see how a greater
discussion of international environmental law could strengthen the result
from an environmental plaintiffs point of view. However, such a discussion
could serve some of the other functions identified earlier, such as providing
a more direct internalization of international norms through reliance on
activities that have occurred elsewhere as support for the need to evaluate
climate change impacts.
Another type of climate change litigation, cases based on public
nuisance, has been far less successful for environmental plaintiffs and also
illustrates the limits of relying upon international environmental law. In
California v. General Motors, the State of California sought damages from
various auto manufacturers on a public nuisance theory." The district
court dismissed the claim as a non-justiciable political question and con-
cluded that resolution of the claim would require a policy decision, intrude
upon the commerce and foreign affairs powers of the political branches, and
was not available under a well-established legal framework.'67 A similar
16 Id. at 369. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1451.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 156-159.
14Kempthorne, 506 F.Supp.2d at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16 Id. at 387-88.
16f California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).167 Id. at *41, *46-47.
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nuisance action, Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company, filed by
several states against electric power generating companies was also re-
jected as raising a non-justiciable political question.'" In that case, decided
before Massachusetts v. EPA, the plaintiffs' cited the UNFCCC as evidence
of U.S. policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.'69 The court, however,
rejected this argument, looked to domestic law, including the Clean Air Act,
and concluded that the question must be left to the political branches. 70
In these tort cases, a greater recognition of international environ-
mental law could have, conceivably, avoided dismissal on political question
grounds. The courts might have looked to either the general obligation to
avoid transboundary environmental impacts or the United States' obliga-
tion to address climate change under UNFCCC as stating relevant law.
Among other problems with this approach, however, the defendants in
these cases were private parties and the obligation that could be attached
would run to the federal government. Accordingly, it is difficult to envision
these international obligations as creating a duty on the part of private
parties. Other problems, such as establishing causation and fashioning an
appropriate remedy, are at least equally troublesome. The significance of
climate change-based tort claims lies elsewhere.' 7 '
The best illustration of the use of international considerations in
climate change cases came in Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge
v. Crombie, in which the Vermont district court concluded that state
regulations governing greenhouse gas emissions were not preempted by
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act and that issues regarding preemp-
tion by the Clean Air Act were moot. 2 The case relied heavily upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. 7' Yet, the court also
discussed the UNFCCC, in conjunction with domestic law, to conclude that
"national foreign policy on global warming encourages the development of
international support for reducing GHG emissions, and that garnering
international support depends in part on informing other nations of this
16 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F.Supp.2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
169 Id. at 274; Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss the Complaints for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State
a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted at 20-21, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
Inc., 406 F.Supp.2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (04 CV 05669 (LAP)).
170 Connecticut, 406 F.Supp. 2d at 269-70, 274.
171 E.g., David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in
Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1744-45 (2007).
172 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge v. Crombie, 508 F.Supp.2d 295, 354, 399
(D.Vt. 2007).
173 See id. at 307-10, 320, 339 n.44, 341, 344, 351, 355, 356, 395 n.104, 397.
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country's commitment to this task on the national, state and local level."'74
The court continued: "The United States remains committed to the
UNFCCC... and the United States considers that state and local efforts
in concert with federal programs contribute to the UNFCCC's ultimate
objective." 175 This discussion illustrates the use of international law to
support sub-national efforts in accord with an international norm. The
approach pro-vides an example of how international environmental law
can be mingled with domestic law in climate change cases to provide
additional support, and to signal consistency between domestic law and
international environmental norms.
V. MAKING THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS EXPLICIT IN
DOMESTIC LITIGATION
Using foreign or international sources in domestic U.S. litigation
will be controversial in any context. It is particularly explosive where it
has made the most headway-human rights questions-but we would ex-
pect similarly heated debate if international norms enter formally domes-
tic U.S. environmental cases. 76 The controversy is "part of larger battles
about the role of judges in the American polity and the role of this nation
in the world."'77 If the United States is going to address climate change,
and it must, international cooperation will be required. In that light,
domestic climate change cases seem a particularly relevant venue for the
consideration of how international law may influence domestic judicial
decision-making.
A decade ago, Daniel Bodansky noted an "impression that, at least
in the United States, international environmental law still depends for its
implementation primarily on political rather than legal processes." 7 '
Bodansky's observation came one year after Kyoto was signed. The land-
scape has changed, particularly in the United States. The failure of the
174 Id. at 394.
175 Id. at 394-95.
176 See Resnick, supra note 61, at 1571-72.
177 Id. at 1572. Resnik continues: "[Clongressional proposals aimed at banning foreign law
provide a window not only into nationalist but also into anti-judicial sentiments in
America." Id.
17' Daniel Bodansky, International Environmental Law in United States Courts, 7 REV.
EUR. CMTY. & INT'LENVTL L. 57,61 (1998). This view of international environmental law
finds support in the D.C. Circuit's opinion in NRDC v. EPA (the methyl bromide case).
See supra note 129 and accompanying discussion.
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federal political branches that has driven the climate change cases makes
legal application of international environmental norms in the United States
attractive and, perhaps, necessary for an effective response.'79 The question
is whether courts applying these norms should do so explicitly.i" This
decision "entails normative and strategic judgments" for courts as domestic
institutions, and as transnational actors.' 8 '
The climate change cases that have been decided implicitly, even
if unintentionally, incorporate some international norms on climate change
into U.S. law. In effect, they prevent use of scientific uncertainty concern-
ing climate change as a legitimate agency rationale for failing to act. This
reflects, and in some cases anticipated, the very high certainty of climate
change science proclaimed in the fourth IPCC synthesis report. By inter-
nalizing the scientific foundation of climate change concerns established
internationally, the U.S. courts encourage the democratic branches to act.
Indeed, several cases, such as Massachusetts v. EPA, suggest a deeper level
of internalization by indirectly acknowledging the need for more robust
governmental action to combat the threat, including emissions reductions
and adaption planning.
The remainder of this Article poses straightforward, narrow, nor-
mtive questions: Should domestic courts explicitly use norms derived from
international treaties and customary law in deciding climate change cases?
If so, in what ways? The answers to these questions turn partially on the
legitimacy-derived from U.S. legal tradition and constitutional princi-
ples-of using international sources in domestic decisions, and partially on
a more functionalist assessment of the value or effect of such use.
A. Legitimacy of Invoking International Environmental Law in Do-
mestic Climate Change Cases
The legitimacy of U.S. court decisions depends, first and foremost,
upon fidelity to the constitution. As noted above, the constitutional text is
179 Jonathan Zasloff, for example, notes that in the context of climate change
"agencies-and therefore the courts-necessarily take international policy into account. The
difficult question remains as to how courts should integrate diplomatic, environmental, and
scientific concerns." Zasloff, supra note 140, at 141. Although related, my contention does
not directly address the diplomatic aspects ofpolicy development, but the development and
implementation of normative and legal consensus. On the relationship of legal norms and
policy in international environmental law, see Beyerlin, supra note 30.
18o See Resnik, supra note 61, at 1612-14.
1 Id. at 1614.
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not clearly dualist and, indeed, early Supreme Court opinions viewed
international and domestic law as "deeply intertwined."182 Although the
extent of dualism in the United States is hotly contested," even a strictly
dualistic conception of the constitution is not a complete bar from judicial
cognizance of certain elements of international law.' In any event, move-
ment toward "a more monistic approach [to consideration of international
sources in domestic cases] can be reconciled with the constitutional text"'8
and has deeper historical support than willed judicial ignorance ofinterna-
tional law."s
To the extent certain traditions weigh against incorporation, we
must consider that legitimacy depends as much on our narrative of what
the constitution requires as it does on fidelity to doctrine.187 "[A] constitu-
tional culture that is open to law made elsewhere will find the doctrine to
render transnational norms acceptable.""s
Even in the current doctrinal landscape, use of climate change
norms to buttress, rather than trump, domestic law decisions is constitu-
tionally acceptable. In climate change cases as elsewhere, courts should
proceed cautiously, "taking care to anchor their use of international sources
in a firm commitment to view their roles as, first and foremost, domestic
actors."" 9 For climate change cases, the over fifteen year existence of the
UNFCCC without contrary legislation supports construing domestic law as
consistent with the international norm requiring state action."9
182 Farber, supra note 89, 124, at 1350.
183 See id. at 1339.
184 Self-executing treaties and customary international law are widely understood as a
part of federal law.
185 Waters, supra note 12, at 696.
1 See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 89, at 755 ("ITihose political and journalistic
commentators who say that the Court has never before cited or relied upon foreign law
are clearly and demonstrably wrong...); see also Mark Tushnet, When is Knowing Less
Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference
to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2006).
187 See Resnik, supra note 61, at 1625-26.
"s T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law
and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 2016 (2004).
189 Waters, supra note 12, at 695.
"9 Cf. Donald A. Brown, The U.S. Performance in Achieving Its 1992 Earth Summit
Global Warming Commitments, 32 ENVTL L. REP. 10741, 10742 (2002) ("UNFCCC
commitments are.., the only international obligations accepted by the United States
that specifically define a national approach to global warming.").
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Legitimacy of using international norms is enhanced by clear U.S.
accession to them.'9' U.S. accession to basic climate change norms is evi-
dent in the UNFCCC and, to a lesser extent, domestic climate-related le-
gislation."9 In addition, continuing participation in, and proclaimed support
for, international negotiations toward a post-2012 climate regime support
a conclusion that the U.S. accepts the consensus on climate change. 93
A preliminary requirement for incorporating international norms
is definitional."9 Just as human rights treaties provide clear evidence of
international human rights norms, so evidence must exist to support
definition of climate change norms before they can be legitimately incorpo-
rated into U.S. decisions. Once identified, however, a major function of
international environmental norms is "providing a framework for interpre-
tation and application of domestic environmental laws and policies." 95 In
the case of climate change, the norms necessary for domestic administra-
tive law litigation are rather easy to identify and define.
Kyoto was effectively rejected by both the legislature and the execu-
tive and, therefore, has limited value for U.S. courts.' 96 However, the
UNFCCC states a key norm for understanding the U.S. commitment to ad-
dress climate change.' 97 The norm against transboundary environmental
harm may also be relevant. To a lesser extent, more recent U.S. actions in
working toward a post-2012 regime may be helpful in understanding the
U.S. commitment and translating it to proper interpretation of domestic law.
From these sources, we can roughly state the following general
consensus norms and principles. First, the problem: anthropocentric
climate change is occurring as a result of greenhouse gas emissions. This
191 In the interpretation of a statute, the courts must be cognizant of the context in which
agencies act. It is in this sense that global climate change norms may be interpretive aids.192 See National Climate Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. (2006).
See Paula J. Dobriansky, U.S. Under Sec'y for Democracy and Global Affairs, Remarks
on the Post-2012 Climate Regime, Remarks at the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the
Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development
(Mar. 16, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/102319.htm.
T94 his discussion is informed by sources cited in notes 29 and 30 the accompanying text.
'9' Final Report of the Expert Group Workshop on International Environmental Law
Aiming at Sustainable Development, Annex I, para. 29, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IEL/WS/3/2
(Oct. 4, 1996).
196 See infra Part V.C.1.
... The UNFCC essentially lays out the commitment to address climate change through
domestic measures. The Kyoto Protocol is more of a technical manual on how certain
nations will meet that commitment. As such, it is the UNFCC that is more valuable for the
purposes discussed here, even if the Kyote Protocol were fair game. See infra Part V.C.2.
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factual statement reflecting a global consensus was accepted by the Su-
preme Court in Massachusetts in a manner approaching recognition of
international consensus. The normative element of problem definition was
also employed by the Court: this change presents a grave threat that
should be addressed. The second element of the consensus on climate
change is the more pressing and le-gally significant norm: states have an
obligation to take mitigation measures.19 The Vermont District Court
essentially recognized this norm in Green Mountain, but the Court skirted
discussing it in Massachusetts.199
In some contexts, invoking international consensus may give rise
to an "international countermajoritarian difficulty.""0 However, several
considerations undermine this concern in the context of the climate change
cases. First, even at its most substantive, international law would be
primarily for the interpretation of domestic statutes.20 1 Thus, potential
countermajoritarian concerns are undermined by the direct consideration
of legislative intent, which should not be overridden by consideration of
international sources. Second, to the extent that Congress disagrees with
a court's construction of a statute, the statute may be amended.
In short, there is no compelling reason that courts cannot look to in-
ternational sources in climate change cases. The question, then, is whether
making international norms explicitly relevant to domestic law adds value.
B. Advantages of Bringing International Norms into Domestic Cli-
mate Change Cases
Although domestic U.S. climate change cases to date have an
important role in the international dialogue concerning climate change
action, a more explicit and direct discussion of the relationship would be
beneficial in several ways. In particular, such discussion would enhance
the United States' leadership position in the international community,
promote the effectiveness of the international climate regime, encourage
198 Additional norms may also be identifiable, such as heightened obligations for
developed nations--common but differentiated responsibility. The legal status of such
norms is far from clear, however. E.g. Beyerlin, supra note 30, at 440-46.
199 Instead, the Court purported to construe the Clean Air Act without consideration of
the international context. Adding a discussion of the international norm would have been
a legitimate move, however. See supra Part IV.B.1.
20 Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM.
J. INT'L L. 57, 59 (2004).201 See infra Part V.C.
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consistency in domestic climate change law, and enable additional checks
on agency actions at the domestic-global interface.2"
1. Enhancing U.S. International Leadership
In a time of unfavorable global opinion toward the United States,
explicit judicial involvement with international norms will move the
United States closer to the international community by acknowledging the
relevance of international environmental norms for our legal system. As
in other contexts, explicit judicial internalization of climate change norms
would "build[ ] U.S. 'soft power,' [enhance] its moral authority, and
strengthen[ ] U.S. capacity for global leadership"2 °3 on climate change, and
other global issues. More specifically, domesticjudicial consideration of the
global climate regime would reaffirm that although the United States has
rejected Kyoto, we take the obligation to respect the global commons seri-
ously by recognizing that obligation as a facet of the domestic legal system.
U.S. courts' overall failure to interact with the international climate
regime, as in other issue areas, has "serious consequences for their roles
in international norm creation."2" As judicial understandings of climate
change law converge, the early and consistent contributors to the transna-
tional judicial dialogue will likely play the strongest role in shaping the
emerging international normative consensus.2"' As Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6 of the Canadian Supreme Court noted in an article describing the
decline of the U.S. Supreme Court's global influence, "[diecisions which
look only inward ... have less relevance to those outside that jurisdic-
202 Most often, judicial recognition of international environmental norms pertaining to
climate change would serve to bolster reasoning and outcomes derived from domestic
sources. In the context of specific cases, Carl Bruch has outlined eight ways in which
international law can be directly employed in domestic litigation:
(1) upholding domestic legislation or regulations, (2) upholding other
governmental or administrative actions, (3) voiding governmental
actions, (4) con-straining the scope of domestic laws or regulations, (5)
challenging actions by a private party, (6) assisting in interpreting
domestic legal and regulatory provisions that are either vague or
complex, (7) as a normative cause of action, and (8) for procedural
matters such as judicial review and standing.
Carl Bruch, Is International Environmental Law Really "Law"?: An Analysis of
Application in Domestic Courts, 23 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 423, 430 (2006).
... Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479, 1480 (2003).
204 Waters, supra note 68, at 557.
215 See id.
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tion." °6 Thus, if U.S. courts hope to participate in shaping the normative
position on climate change adopted by judiciaries throughout the world,
explicit recognition of the relationship between domestic and international
law is vital.
With climate change in particular, norm development through
domestic application should be an important aspect of global learning. The
problem requires a global solution beyond the scope of any prior multi-
lateral environmental agreements. This provides a situation in which U.S.
judicial reasoning in applying aspects of climate regime thinking to con-
crete problems will fall into fertile international policy soil.
Accordingly, the recognition of international norms in domestic
climate change litigation may play a strengthening role in the perception
of U.S. leadership, encourage U.S. development and exportation of effective
domestic climate strategies, and promote international agreements that
will enhance consistency with such approaches. In short, explicit judicial
discussion of international climate change norms as harmonious with U.S.
law can enhance U.S. ability to regain a global leadership position on the
issue and, thereby, more significantly shape the future of the international
climate regime.
2. Promoting the Effectiveness of the International Response
Along with promoting U.S. interests and standing in the interna-
tional community, climate change litigation has a direct role to play in
developing the international regime if courts directly engage that
regime." 7 Just as the United States as an actor may benefit from ac-
knowledging and applying international norms, the regime in which the
actions occur will benefit through application and acceptance. Indeed, a
case such as Massachusetts v. EPA that directly engages only domestic
law can nonetheless be understood to impact international lawmaking by
considering its actors."' More important, however, will be cases in which
the domestic judiciary gives life to international agreements through
direct engagement-a "role [that] is particularly important as a check on
the delegitimization of international legal rules that are not enforced."" 9
2 6 Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist
Court, 34 TULSA L. J. 15, 38 (1998).
207 See, e.g., Hari Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part II:
Narratives of Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 573, 599-600 (2008).
20 Osofsky, supra note 9, at 203.
20" Slaughter, supra note 62, at 1103 n.1.
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Assuming, as we must in the arena of climate change, that interna-
tional law can only effect significant changes in behavior through penetra-
tion of the domestic sphere, domestic litigation that employs international
law not only provides an instance in which the international appears ef-
fective but, more importantly, molds it into a shape that will enable fur-
ther use in domestic cases or suggest necessary changes internationally.
By engaging the international, domestic cases can also provide
articulation for the norms that have emerged. The precise meaning of the
UNFCCC obligation that nations take measures must be hammered out
on the ground. In the United States, if Congress has not acted, it is appro-
priate for the courts to begin this process by measuring particular actions
against the standard.
3. Encouraging Consistency in Domestic Law and Policy
In the absence of national climate change law and policy, explicit
discussion of international sources and norms in litigation will provide
a well-developed baseline for a uniform judicial approach in the domes-
tic realm. This could occur both within and beyond the United States.
Within the United States, bringing international environmental
law into the mix of judicial reasoning would provide common grounding
that unifies the decisions and begins to construct a more systematic
preference for development of an effective legal response to international
threats. Specifically, if an international climate change norm is found
relevant to interpretation of a domestic statute, reference will be appropri-
ate to that norm when future questions of interpretation of the domestic
statute arise.210 Thus, to the extent that climate change cases rely upon
consensus concerning the scientific evidence of climate change, future
cases should use that consensus as a measuring stick for claims of scien-
tific uncertainty.2n The same can occur with norm development. For
example, had the Court in Massachusetts tied its jurisdictional or substan-
tive holding to an identifiable norm, the opinion would have greater clarity
and value as a precedent in other contexts within the United States.
210 Much as the use of foreign law regarding criminalization in Bowers v. Hardwick urged
its use in Roper v. Simmons, discussion of international norms in one climate change case
will suggest its use in future cases. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1189 (2005).
2 1 An example is Green Mountain's use of Massachusetts for this purpose. See supra Part
IV.B.2.
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Outside the United States, this approach would provide value to
other, more transnationally oriented domestic courts.212 This would serve
a norm entrepreneurship function and likely increase agreement among
domestic courts on how to approach climate change issues raised under
statutes designed for other purposes.
4. Enabling a Check at the Domestic-International Interface
Finally, climate change litigation has something to offer for the
growth of administrative law at the interface of domestic and international
law. At least two points are noteworthy.
First, U.S. courts can serve a unique function of providing legal
accountability for U.S. failure to honor its UNFCCC commitments.213
Although this might be achieved implicitly, arguably the approach of
Massachusetts, doing so explicitly would provide a check of a different
magnitude. An explicit check here would serve the purposes identified
above, as well as offering the practical benefit of increasing compliance.
The dualist tradition, and perhaps concerns of domestic political
backlash, weigh against grounding a decision solely in the UNFCC. How-
ever, looking to it as a major point in a narrative defining the development
of a partly domestic obligation to take national action for the redress of
climate change would serve the same beneficial purpose. This approach
has the advantage of building a significant bridge over the dualist divide
between domestic and international law without ripping the Court's
analysis from traditional, dualist moorings.
Secondly, bridging the dualist divide could have future advantages
for an inverse problem. With a greater history of considering international
obligation as it relates to domestic law, courts may become more comfort-
able peering into the informal regulatory role that EPA and other agencies
play on the world stage.214 While the exact contours of such review are
beyond the scope of this article, it is possible to envision a review that
would assure that EPA activities as a transnational actor do not contra-
vene the agency's mandate under domestic law.
212 See, e.g., L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 206.
21 See Slaughter, supra note 62, at 1103 n.1.
214 Cf Kingsbury et al., supra note 58, at 31 ("domestic institutions have often taken the
lead in trying to check the global administration").
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C. How U.S. Courts Should Use International Climate Change
Norms
In the near future, climate change cases in U.S. courts are likely to
increase. In the absence of a comprehensive national policy, challenges to
regulatory action based on climate change concerns are likely to grow, as
is the drive to find additional litigation hooks for compelling action to
reduce emissions. With a new administration, a renewed push for more
comprehensive climate policy is likely. If successful, any new legislative or
regulatory framework will surely trigger challenges. In any of these situa-
tions, international law has something to offer domestic courts.215
As the discussion above demonstrates, I am not urging that U.S.
courts adopt a strict monist stance. Their authority derives from a consti-
tution that, whatever its susceptibility to monist interpretation, has been
interpreted as at least partly dualist for over a century. That tradition can
be respected even as courts enter into transnational dialogue on global
environmental threats.216
International norms must be identified carefully, along with the
degree of U.S. accession to them. There are now two basic sources demon-
strating existing normative consensus in the international climate regime:
UNFCCC and Kyoto. Each can be used by U.S. courts for a distinct purpose.
1. Kyoto and Its Implementation: Assessing Practice
The value of the Kyoto Protocol in the United States is limited
because the political branches have rejected it.2"7 However, as a treaty
adopted by every other developed country on the planet, actions under it
may offer a reference point for understanding U.S. actions toward meeting
UNFCCC commitments. For example, determining whether agency action
is reasonable rather than arbitrary may, in the context of a global threat
with little precedent in U.S. law, be aided by examining what standards
have developed internationally or in foreign jurisdictions. Pointing to
similar practices throughout Kyoto nations may demonstrate an agency's
reasonableness, even though Kyoto is not a substantive standard in the
United States. Likewise, an agency practice that is contrary to much of the
world would suggest arbitrariness, perhaps in an informal burden-shifting
21 See supra Part V.B.
"' See supra Part V.A.
217 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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way. It is supported further by the role of customary international law that
states should avoid transboundary environmental harm.
2. UNFCCC: Interpreting U.S. Law
The climate change cases are not likely to be constitutional, unlike
human rights cases. Therefore, courts should be understood to have signifi-
cant leeway in looking to global consensus in understanding the develop-
ment of U.S. positions and agency actions. The norm espoused in the
UNFCCC-that states have an obligation to address climate change
through domestic action-can directly guide judicial understanding of the
context in which U.S. statutes and administrators operate.218
Courts could look to the UNFCCC as an initial statement of U.S.
commitment. In the absence of any significant evidence that the nation has
renounced the obligation to redress climate change, the commitment
should be used to interpret domestic law and frame agency obligations.
Thus, in the context of climate change, international norms should
serve a Charming Betsy function. The Court should read domestic statutes
in harmony with the norms developed in the UNFCCC and customary in-
ternational law. Unless it has renounced its promises, the U.S. should be
held to its obligation to take action seriously aimed at redressing climate
change in order to avoid damaging the territory of other nations and the
global commons. It is a collective responsibility that must, in large part, be
enforced by each actor upon itself. The courts are a direct and legitimate
line toward bringing the framework to fruition in the United States.
CONCLUSION
Climate change is a global commons problem that is being ad-
dressed by virtually the entire international community simultaneously.
Undoubtedly, there are lessons of both practice and theory that the United
States can learn from the work being done in other nations.
Largely because of the political branches' failure to confront climate
change, the courts are on the front line of U.S. climate change law develop-
ment. Understanding how to read U.S. environmental statutes or assess
U.S. agency action in light of the growth of scientific and legal awareness
of humanity's impact on the climate is a daunting task.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
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If ever there is a situation in which the U.S. courts should look
outward for aid in understanding a shared problem, climate change is it.
Within constitutional bounds, the court can employ the norms enshrined
in the UNFCCC to understand U.S. statutes and the developments under
the Kyoto Protocol to understand agency practice.
This approach will benefit the nation not only at home but interna-
tionally as well. It will strengthen soft power to guide negotiations on the
climate regime and perhaps other issues. By engaging the norms of the
international community, the courts can add the U.S. normative perspec-
tive into the consensus and become a leader in transnational understand-
ing of the judicial role in tackling the emerging law of climate change.
